Armenia tried to use this event for its own benefit, and it argued that the main purpose of the intervention by the Soviet Army in Azerbaijan was to stop the so-called pogrom against the Armenian population in Baku led by the Azerbaijani people.
However, the main reason for the intervention by the Soviet military forces in Baku that night was totally different. At that time, the Armenian SSR was subjecting Azerbaijan to aggression. Armenia violated the territorial integrity of Azerbaijan and tried to annex Nagorno-Karabakh to Armenia. However, the central government in Moscow was not taking any measures against the Armenians, who were also violating the Soviet constitution, which stated that the autonomous regions of the Union republics were not entitled to secede without the consent of the Union republics and the central government of the Soviet Union. In addition to this, an ethnic cleansing campaign had also been carried out since 1988 against the Azerbaijani population in Armenia and in the western part of Azerbaijan by Armenian military groups. Azerbaijanis living in Armenia were expelled from their own homes with unprecedented brutality and many of them, including old people, women and children, were killed.
At the beginning of 1989, with the special decision by the Central Committee of the Communist Party and the Council of Ministers of the Soviet Union, the jurisdiction of Azerbaijan over Nagorno-Karabakh was removed and the Soviet Union began to rule it directly. According to a statute of the Supreme Soviet Presidium of the Soviet Union, a special form of administration for Nagorno-Karabakh was introduced. This effectively meant that the Azerbaijani SSR lost control of Nagorno-Karabakh. On November 27, Moscow’s direct rule ended with the decision of the central government, and it was returned to Azerbaijan’s jurisdiction. However, on December 1, 1989, Armenia adopted a resolution on the “Reunification of the Armenian SSR and the Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast”. As a result of all these events at that time, an Azeri national movement emerged against the backdrop of the dual Soviet policy and the withdrawal of the Azerbaijani population from its historical territory. At the end of 1989, the national independence movement, led by the Azerbaijan Popular Front, had achieved incredible momentum, with hundreds of thousands of people demonstrating in support of the ideals of independence and territorial integrity as a reaction to the resolution adopted by the Supreme Soviet of Armenia in favor of annexing Nagorno-Karabakh to Armenia. Thus, all developments in Azerbaijan at the end of 1989 increased popular loyalty towards the Azerbaijan Popular Front instead of loyalty towards the communist government in the country.
However, the Soviet Union was unable to tolerate the loss of strategically-important and energy-rich Azerbaijan. The Soviet authorities thought that the natural wealth of Azerbaijan would help slow down disintegration and prevent the economic collapse of the Union, even though the oil price on the world market was low at that time. On the other hand, they intended to teach other members of the Soviet Union a lesson, especially the Baltic States and Georgia, which also had pro-independence thoughts. In this regard, the crackdown on the Azerbaijani Popular Front was a necessity for Moscow. They therefore asked the leader of the KGB, Kryuchkov, to prepare a plan to prevent the Popular Front winning the upcoming elections. For this reason, the Soviet authorities needed a pretext to justify Soviet military intervention in Baku. Thus, a so-called pogrom against the Armenian population in Baku, organized by the KGB, served the interests of the Soviet Union. As a result, violence erupted between January 13 and 15, 1990. On January 16, the violence was stopped and the Armenian population in Baku was saved, mostly through the efforts by the Popular Front.
However, the Soviet leadership used this violence as an argument to justify the Soviet intervention in Azerbaijan. The military contingent that entered Baku was informed that they were going to protect the rights of Russians and Armenians, which were being violated by the local population. However, this was explicit disinformation. The real reason for the Soviet attack was totally different. The invasion of Baku by the Soviet Army was clearly intended to stop the dissolution of the Communist regime, crush any opposition in Azerbaijan’s bid for independence, and preserve the status quo. During an interview, Dmitri Yazov told a group of Soviet journalists who were in Baku at that time that the Kremlin wanted to smash the “structure of power” established by the Azerbaijani Popular Front in “all offices and enterprises” in the southern republic. He said that “extremists” had gone “underground,” making it very difficult for the armed forces to fulfill their task of restoring order in Azerbaijan”. Regarding this, a Human Rights Watch report clearly states: “Indeed, the violence used by the Soviet Army on the night of January 19-20 was so out of proportion to the resistance offered by Azerbaijanis as to constitute an exercise in collective punishment. Since Soviet officials have stated publicly that the purpose of the intervention of Soviet troops was to prevent the ouster of the Communist-dominated government of the Republic of Azerbaijan by the nationalist-minded, noncommunist opposition, the punishment inflicted on Baku by Soviet soldiers may have been intended as a warning to nationalists, not only in Azerbaijan, but in the other Republics of the Soviet Union”.
Even if the intervention was to prevent the spread of violence, it may be worth asking why the 13,000 Soviet military forces that were stationed in Baku during the violence watched silently and did not adopt any measures, even when the Popular Front leadership appealed to the Minister of Internal Affairs to deploy those forces in order to restore stability and order. However, they stated that there was a direct order not to intervene.
It was also reported that the list of innocent Black January victims included people from different communities in Azerbaijan, such as Russians, Jews, and others. The Soviet argument that the Russian troops entered Azerbaijan in order to stop the so-called violation against the Soviet citizens had no justification, because the Azerbaijani people who died as a result of the Armenian pogroms were also Soviet citizens, and the Soviet army did not intervene in Armenia to stop the pogroms against Azerbaijanis. Soviet mass media did not even mention that tragedy, and the crime was silently overlooked. Also, before that happened in Azerbaijan, the brutal military attacks by Soviet troops in Almaty in 1986, in Tbilisi in 1989, and then in Lithuania’s capital Vilnius in 1991, proved that there were political reasons for the January 20 event. It appears as the last breathe of the Giant, as that era was the decline of the Soviet Empire.
 Miller, Donald E., “The Role of Historical Memory in Interpreting Events in the Republic of Armenia”, in Hovannisian, Richard G., (ed.), Remembrance and Denial: The Case of the Armenian Genocide (Wayne State University Press, 1994), p. 194.
 Mammadov, Mushfig, “Legal Aspects of the Nagorno-Garabagh Conflict”, Caucasian Review of International Affairs, Vol. 1, No. 1, 2006, p. 16.
 Avakian, Shahen, Nagorno-Karabakh: Legal Aspect (TIGRAN METS Publishing House, 2010), p. 16.
 Cornell, Svante E., Azerbaijan Since Independence (M. E. Sharpe, 2011), p. 53.
 Seyidov, Vugar, “Soviet Army in “Black January”: To Save or Kill?”, AzerTac, January 22, 2010; https://azertag.az/en/xeber/SOVIET_ARMY_IN_BLACK_JANUARY_TO_SAVE_OR_KILL-588101. Accessed on October 2, 2020.
 Dobbs, Michael, “Soviets Say Troops Used To Avert Coup in Baku; Nationalists Said to Plan Seizure of Power”, The Washington Post, January 27, 1990, p. 13.
 Human Rights Watch/Helsinki, Conflict in the Soviet Union: Black January in Azerbaidzhan (Human Rights Watch, 1991), p. 4.
 Seyidov, “Soviet Army in “Black January”. See also: Altstadt, Audrey, The Azerbaijani Turks: Power and Identity under the Russian Rule (Hoover Institution Press, 1992), p. 213.