As a result of the demands to unify Nagorno-Karabakh to Armenia, the Supreme Soviet of Armenia adopted a resolution announcing the unification of Nagorno-Karabakh, the autonomous region of Azerbaijan, with Armenia.[1] When the conflict escalated, the rhetoric about unification with Armenia ceased, and in 1992 the so-called Nagorno-Karabakh Republic declared its independence.[2] However, any sovereign countries, including Armenia, and institutions had not recognized this illegitimate entity.

Armenia did not recognize, in fact, the so-called Nagorno-Karabakh Republic de jure, but the de facto relationships of Armenia with the unrecognized republic were at a high level. The first representative of the so-called Nagorno-Karabakh Republic was duly based in Yerevan, and Armenia also had its representative unit in Khankendi (Stepanakert). More than 100 agreements had been signed between the parties, covering various fields of cooperation.[3] Although this was not based on international legislation, Armenia sent its citizens to Karabakh for military service.[4] Besides, the home state, Armenia, mainly supplied the so-called republic’s national budget.

Armenia’s recognition of the so-called Nagorno-Karabakh Republic was widely discussed in Armenian society. The issue had periodically appeared on the country’s parliamentary agenda,[5] although most of the members of the Armenian parliament had rejected it. Indeed, former Armenian president Serzh Sarkisian had also stated that they would not recognize the independence of the so-called Nagorno-Karabakh Republic unless negotiations continue with Azerbaijan.[6]

In this regard, it is possible to list the following possible reasons why Armenia did not de jure recognize the independence of the so-called Nagorno-Karabakh Republic before the Second Karabakh War.

Firstly, Armenia identifies itself not as a party to the conflict claiming territory from a neighboring state but as a related state interested in protecting the rights of its ethnic group. In this case, if Armenia had recognized the independence of the so-called Nagorno-Karabakh Republic, its role in the conflict might be challenged, and the country could find pressure being exerted on it by the international community. Therefore, there was no need to be the first sovereign state to recognize the independence of the so-called republic. However, it has not been ruled out that Armenia might alter its decision if the independence of the so-called Nagorno-Karabakh Republic were to be recognized by any other country.

Secondly, Armenian officials believed that recognizing the so-called Nagorno-Karabakh Republic would allow Azerbaijan to reject the OSCE Minsk Group’s mediation role and even stop the negotiations,[7] resulting in an increased threat to peace. It had also been assumed that recognizing the so-called Nagorno-Karabakh Republic would radicalize Azerbaijan and that, in the end, the war would break out against not only the so-called Nagorno-Karabakh Republic but also Armenia.[8]

Thirdly, it was assumed that recognition of the so-called Nagorno-Karabakh Republic would also have a negative effect on the Turkish-Armenian rapprochement process, which was suspended due to Turkey’s preconditions regarding the “Armenian genocide” and Nagorno-Karabakh conflict.[9] Recognition of the so-called Nagorno-Karabakh Republic independence might also kill normalization initiatives, which were crucial for Armenia, due to the fact that Turkey and Azerbaijan isolate the country.

Thus, by recognizing the de facto independence of the so-called Nagorno-Karabakh Republic, Armenia established high-level bilateral relations, supported the region with necessary weaponry and other goods, played the role of leading financial donor, and took control of all Armenian initiatives aimed at settling the conflict prior the Second Karabakh War. However, it seems that de jure recognition of the so-called Nagorno-Karabakh Republic was not a priority for Armenia, as indicated above.

[1] Fraser, Niall M., Hipel, Keith W., Jaworsky, John, and Zuljan, Ralph, “A Conflict Analysis of the Armenian-Azerbaijani Dispute,” The Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 34, No. 4, 1990, p. 659.

[2] “Declaration on State Independence of the Nagorno Karabakh Republic,” Office of the Nagorno-Karabakh Republic in the USA, January 6, 1992; http://www.nkrusa.org/nk_conflict/declaration_independence.shtml. Accessed on December 5, 2022.

[3] “Kocharyan: Armenia should not recognize NKR’s independence at this stage,” Panaroma | Armenian News, 12 November 2013; https://www.panorama.am/en/news/2013/11/12/shavarsh-qocharyan/406743. Accessed on December 4, 2022.

[4] Najafov, Farhad R., “Examining Armenian-Azerbaijani Territorial Relations and Self-Determination,” International Policy Digest, November, 2013.

[5] Grigoryan, Marianna, “Armenia: Nagorno-Karabakh Independence Unlikely to Win Parliamentary Approval,” Eurasianet, October 12, 2010; https://eurasianet.org/armenia-nagorno-karabakh-independence-unlikely-to-win-parliamentary-approval. Accessed on December 5, 2022.

[6] “Why Armenia Cannot Recognize Abkhazia, South Ossetia Independence,” Press.am, January 27, 2011; https://epress.am/en/2011/01/27/why-armenia-cannot-recognize-abkhazia-south-ossetia-independence.html. Accessed on December 5, 2022.

[7] Kocharyan: Armenia should not recognize NKR’s independence at this stage”.

[8] Grigoryan, “Armenia: Nagorno-Karabakh Independence Unlikely to Win Parliamentary Approval”.

[9] Göksel, Nigar, “Turkey and Armenia Post Protocols: Back to Square One?” TESEV: Foreign Policy Program, October 12, 2012, pp. 8-12.