What was the de facto status of the so-called Nagorno-Karabakh Republic prior to the Second Karabakh War?

On September 2, 1991, the Karabakh Soviet proclaimed the independence of the so-called Nagorno-Karabakh Republic over the territories of the NKAO and the Shaumyan district of Azerbaijan. On December 10, 1991, a ‘referendum’ was held in Nagorno-Karabakh to determine the region’s status. The referendum was held only in those territories inhabited by the Armenian majority. As expected, Armenians voted for the independence of the so-called Nagorno-Karabakh Republic. The Azerbaijan parliament, in turn, annulled the autonomous status of Nagorno-Karabakh and reduced it to the same level as other regions of Azerbaijan. After this, the First Karabakh War broke out between Azerbaijan, Armenia, and the Armenians of Nagorno-Karabakh. Since the ceasefire of 1994, by controlling the occupied territories of Azerbaijan, the so-called Nagorno-Karabakh Republic had been trying to gain recognition as an independent state. Although no state or international organization recognized its independence, the so-called Nagorno-Karabakh Republic established its governmental structure and state institutions. It managed to keep its existence as a de facto state until the Second Karabakh War of 2020 with the assistance of the Armenian Republic.

Scholars in academic literature define unrecognized states like the so-called former Nagorno-Karabakh Republic as “de facto,” “unrecognized,” “quasi,” or “pseudo” states.[1] Generally, these so-called states control the territories they claim and establish acting state and governmental institutions but are not recognized by the international community as sovereign states.[2] Most of these unrecognized states, in fact, never gain recognition.[3] Moreover, the unwritten rules of international relations drawn up in the post-World War II period strictly restrict the establishment of new states over the territory of another state.[4]

The so-called Nagorno-Karabakh Republic authorities argued that the state’s independence was declared within the framework of internal and international legal norms. Therefore, until the Second Karabakh War resulted in the liberation of Azerbaijan’s occupied territories, they acquired the required attributes and structure for forming an independent state.[5] In international law, the sovereign state is conceptualized in the Montevideo Convention on the Right and Duties of the State. According to this Convention, an entity may be considered a sovereign state if it meets the following criteria: a permanent population, a defined territory, a government, and a capacity to enter into relations with other states.[6] The so-called Nagorno-Karabakh Republic met the first three criteria but was not capable of entering into relations with other states due to a lack of proper recognition. In this regard, Scott Pegg argued that regardless of the effectiveness of unrecognized quasi-states, they should be accepted as illegitimate.[7]

Since unrecognized quasi-states have no international status, they have no right to be a member of any international organizations and carry out diplomatic missions. In this vein, Scott Pegg stated the following:

The de facto state views itself as capable of entering into relations with other states and it seeks full constitutional independence and widespread international recognition as a sovereign state. It is, however, unable to achieve any degree of substantive recognition and therefore remains illegitimate in the eyes of international society.[8]

Moreover, when classifying the international community’s response to unrecognized states, Scott Pegg identified three primary attitudes: the international community opposes using sanctions and embargos, ignores and does not deal with them, and provides very limited acknowledgment of their presence.[9]

Although, until the Second Karabakh War, no international organization recognized the so-called Nagorno-Karabakh Republic, it had permanent representative offices in various states, which offered a minimal acknowledgment of its presence. No independent state had established diplomatic relations with this unrecognized state, not even Armenia. The so-called Nagorno-Karabakh Republic’s diplomatic relations was limited to cooperation with other unrecognized quasi-states such as Abkhazia, South Ossetia, and Transnistria. These so-called states founded the Community for Democracy and Rights of Nations, also known as the Commonwealth of Unrecognized States.

Ignorance and the embargo placed on the so-called Nagorno-Karabakh Republic had badly affected its economic development. The Republic of Armenia and the Armenian Diaspora abroad provided direct financial support.[10] Its diplomatic isolation prevented it from receiving external development assistance. As a result of the First Karabakh War, the region’s pre-war industrial infrastructure and agriculture system collapsed and had not been fully reconstructed prior to the Second Karabakh War.[11] Due to its landlocked position and lack of legal status, significant direct foreign investment in the region was unlikely.[12] Any investment contracts that might be signed with the so-called Nagorno-Karabakh Republic would not be internationally binding, and foreign companies would not be eager to invest in its territory.

In practice, unrecognized quasi-states reduce the effects of an embargo and isolation through the assistance they receive from external entities with a direct and indirect interest in their existence. Armenia, in this regard, sponsored the so-called Nagorno-Karabakh Republic and provided substantial opportunities. It is a fact that most inhabitants of the so-called Nagorno-Karabakh Republic were citizens of Armenia and traveled abroad on an Armenian passport. Another essential factor for the existence of the so-called Nagorno-Karabakh Republic was the Armenian Diaspora. There was no doubt that without the direct support of Armenia and the Diaspora, it would be impossible for the so-called Nagorno-Karabakh Republic to keep its existence.

Thus, the de facto status of the so-called former Nagorno-Karabakh Republic could be defined as that of an unrecognized quasi-state since it did not meet the required criteria for sovereign states, according to the accepted norms of international law. Additionally, this quasi-state could not decide on its future without considering external factors. Viewed from this perspective, the so-called Nagorno-Karabakh Republic was an illegal entity that lost its existence at the liberation of the occupied territories of Azerbaijan as a result of the Second Karabakh War.


[1] Pegg, Scott, International Society and the De Facto State (Ashgate1998). See also: King, Charles, “The Benefits of Ethnic War: Understanding Eurasia’s Unrecognized States,” World Politics, Vol. 53, No. 4, 2001. See also: Lynch, Dov, “Separatist States and Post Soviet Conflicts”, International Affairs, Vol. 78, No. 4, 2002.

[2] Kolsto, Pal, “The Sustainability and Future of Unrecognized Quasi-States,” Journal of Peace Research, Vol. 43, No. 6, 2006, p. 726.

[3] Pegg, Scott, “De Facto States in the International System,” Institute of International Relations of the University of British Columbia, Working Paper No. 21, February 1998, p. 2.

[4] Österud, Öyvind, “The Narrow Gate: Entry to the Club of Sovereign States,” Review of International Studies, Vol. 23, No. 2, 1997.

[5] Avakian, Shahen, Nagorno-Karabakh: Legal Aspect (Tigran Mets Publishing House, 2010), p. 17.

[6] “Article 2,” Montevideo Convention on the Right and Duties of the State.

[7] Pegg, Scott, International Society and the De Facto State (Ashgate, 1998), p. 5.

[8] Pegg, Scott, “De Facto States in the International System,” Institute of International Relations of the University of British Columbia, Working Paper No. 21, February 1998, p. 1.

[9] Pegg, “De Facto States in the International System,” p. 4.

[10] King, Charles, “The Benefits of Ethnic War: Understanding Eurasia’s Unrecognized States,” World Politics, Vol. 53, No. 4, 2001, p. 543.

[11] King, “The Benefits of Ethnic War,” p. 536.

[12] Kolsto, Pal, “The Sustainability and Future of Unrecognized Quasi-States,” Journal of Peace Research, Vol. 43, No. 6, 2006, p. 729.